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Hathaway v. State, 71 P.3d 503 (Nev. 2003)1
Criminal Law – Habeas Corpus
Summary
Proper person appeal from an order of the Eighth Judicial District Court, Honorable John
S. McGroarty, denying appellant’s post-conviction petition for writ of habeas corpus.
Disposition/Outcome
Reversed and remanded for evidentiary hearing on the issue of good cause to excuse
procedural time-bar.
Factual and Procedural History
Petitioner Hathaway was convicted of one count of first-degree murder, one count of
sexual assault, and one count of attempted sexual assault, pursuant to a guilty plea, on December
11, 1998. He was sentenced to two concurrent terms of life with possibility of parole and a third
concurrent term of 20 years with possibility of parole after 8 years. No direct appeal was filed.
On November 6, 2001, Petitioner filed his proper person post-conviction petition for writ
of habeas corpus in the district court. He alleged: (1) he had been deprived of a direct appeal
without his consent; (2) there was cause to excuse his delay in filing the petition because he filed
within a reasonable time after he learned no appeal was filed; (3) immediately after sentencing,
he told his attorney that he wanted to appeal and his attorney indicated he would take care of it;
and (4) after the sentencing, his attorney failed to respond to any further communication, and
only after inquiry to the Nevada Supreme Court did he learn the appeal was not filed.
The State objected to the petition, arguing it was procedurally barred because it was
untimely and Hathaway failed to demonstrate adequate cause for the delay. The district court
declined to appoint post-conviction counsel or allow an evidentiary hearing under Nevada
Revised Statute 34.750 and 34.770, and denied the petition as untimely. Petitioner appealed.
The Nevada Supreme Court, Justices Robert Rose, William Maupin and Mark Gibbons,
per curiam, held the Court’s previous holding in Harris v. Warden2 did not preclude a finding of
good cause. The court found: (1) an appeal deprivation claim is not good cause where it was
reasonably available to the petitioner within the one-year statutory period for filing a postconviction petition for writ of habeas corpus; and (2) good cause existed where Petitioner
believed his counsel was filing a direct appeal and raised his claim within a reasonable time
period after learning the direct appeal had not been filed.

1
2

By Melanie Koep.
114 Nev. 956, 964 P.2d 785 (1998).

Discussion
Under Nevada Revised Statute 34.726(1), a post-conviction petition for writ of habeas
corpus must be filed within one year after entry of the judgment of conviction, if no direct appeal
is filed, unless good cause is shown for the delay. “Generally, ‘good cause’ means a ‘substantial
reason; one that affords a legal excuse.’”3 Good cause to excuse procedural default may be
demonstrated: (1) by showing that “an impediment external to the defense” prevented the
petitioner from filing in a timely manner;4 or (2) by a (timely) claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel if counsel was so ineffective as to violate the Sixth Amendment.5 An adequate
allegation of good cause would sufficiently explain why an otherwise untimely petition was filed
outside the statutory time frame. However, a claim which was reasonably available to the
petitioner during the statutory time period would not constitute good cause.
The Nevada Supreme Court’s previous ruling in Harris provided that an allegation of
ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to inform a claimant of the right to appeal, or any
other allegation of deprivation of direct appeal without consent, does not constitute good cause
for failing to timely file a petition under Nevada Revised Statute 34.726.6 Conversely, in
Loveland v. Hatcher,7 the Ninth Circuit noted that if a petitioner believes his attorney is pursuing
a direct appeal, he will not file his own post-conviction petition. Accordingly, it held a
petitioner’s reliance upon his counsel to file a direct appeal sufficiently excuses procedural
default where petitioner demonstrates he actually believed his counsel was filing an appeal, the
belief was objectively reasonable, and his post-conviction relief petition was filed within a
reasonable time after he should have known his counsel was not undertaking a direct appeal.
Petitioner Hathaway filed his petition for post-conviction relief approximately three years
after sentencing. Accordingly, without a showing of good cause, his petition should be barred as
untimely. Hathaway claimed he had good cause to excuse the delay because of the ineffective
assistance of his counsel. He alleged that he asked his attorney to file an appeal, he believed his
attorney was pursuing the appeal, and he filed his petition for relief within a reasonable time
after learning his counsel had not made a direct appeal. While the Court generally will not
disturb a district court’s finding of good cause, the district court, in this case, misplaced its
reliance on Harris. A deprivation claim is not good cause if it was available to the petitioner
within the statutory time period; however, the ruling in Harris should not be read to preclude all
consideration of good cause simply because a case involves an appeal deprivation claim.
Hathaway raised claims which, if true, would entitle him to relief. However, those facts
were not a part of the record because the district court failed to conduct an evidentiary hearing
regarding the allegations. The Court could not determine whether Hathaway was entitled to
relief, without knowing whether Hathaway believed his counsel filed an appeal, whether that
belief was objectively reasonable, and whether Hathaway filed his petition for writ of habeas
corpus within a reasonable time frame. Accordingly, the case was remanded for an evidentiary
hearing to determine if Hathaway can show good cause under the Loveland test. If good cause is
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established under Hathaway’s claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, Hathaway will have
established undue prejudice necessary to excuse the one-year time limitation.
Conclusion
The Nevada Supreme Court’s previous ruling in Harris should not be construed so
broadly. The District Court must consider the issue of good cause to excuse the delay for filing a
post-conviction petition for relief and must not deny relief or an evidentiary hearing simply
because the claim is one which is characterized as an appeal deprivation claim. The district
court’s order was reversed in its entirety and remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine
whether Petitioner Hathaway can demonstrate good cause to excuse the delay in filing his
petition.

